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PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN A PLANNED
ECONOMY: IMPLEMENTATION AND
NULLIFICATION OF SOVIET LAW
George . Armstrong, Jr. t
INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union's adoption of a new Constitution in 1977 sig-
naled to many western scholars a fundamental change in Soviet pol-
icy concerning the rights of individuals to use private property for
profit-making activities. I The new Constitution appears to acknowl-
edge that the state owned, centrally planned economy has been
unable to satisfy demand for food and light consumer goods. In
addition, it seems to indicate that Soviet leaders have approved an
expanded role in the economy for private production. In 1977, how-
ever, it was not apparent whether the Soviet government would
implement the new constitutional provisions, or whether the modifi-
cations were significant only as propaganda.
Sufficient time has passed to judge, at least preliminarily, both
the effect of the provisions of the new Constitution on the rights of
individuals to use private property for profit, and the degree of offi-
cial commitment to private enterprise as an alternative means of pro-
duction. The responses of central, regional, and local legislative
bodies, administrative agencies, collective farm managers, academic
commentators, and individual farmers and handicraftsmen to the
new constitutional norms demonstrate that implementation of this
fundamental law in the Soviet Union is a complex process. The pol-
t Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D. University of
Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Princeton University. Author of THE SovIET LAW OF PROPERTY
(1983).
The author wishes to thank Professors Myres McDougal, B.J. George, James Brook,
and George Dent of New York Law School for their comments on an earlier version of
this paper. Andrew Penson, a third year student at this school, also assisted in the
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I. See, e.g., Ginsburgs and Pomorski, A Profile ofthe Soviet Constitution of 1977, in
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THE UNION REPUBLICS: ANALYSIS, TEXTS,
REPORTS 3 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge, ed. 1979); Hazard, Constitutionfor Developed Socialisam,
20 L. E. EuR. I (Part 111978); Luryi, New Constitution ofthe U.S.S.R From Draft to Law,
id at 35.
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icies of the highest officials are often stymied by the hostility of their
subordinates toward those policies, as well as by bureaucratic inertia,
deliberate footdragging, and manpower and resource shortages.
The new rights to use private property for profit relate primarily
to the agricultural sector. In addition, Soviet leaders favor some lib-
eralization of the restrictions on private cottage industry and retail
sales. The norms governing private manufacture are so ideologically
sensitive, however, that the central government cannot disclose its
true policy. In the area of handicrafts and private retail sales the
government implements its policy of liberalization by creating
opportunities for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or nullifica-
tion of the law. This manner of implementation allows the leader-
ship to encourage certain economic behavior which is nonetheless
criminal under Soviet law. Thus, by steadfastly condemning private
enterprise, the Soviet leadership attempts to display its commitment
to maintaining the ideological purity of Marxism in its policies, but,
in reality, it tolerates a flourishing black market.
This article examines the legislation implementing the 1977
Constitution, and the response of governmental and quasi-govern-
mental officials to this legislation. This study demonstrates that
although Soviet peasants welcome the opportunity to commit more
of their resources to private agriculture, local government officials
have not distributed authorized state agricultural subsidies, assisted
in the collection and sale of farm produce, or provided farm imple-
ments to the peasants, thereby impeding the orderly implementation
of the new laws. Thus, the program of public assistance to private
agriculture is failing. At the same time, an examination of Soviet
handicrafts and private retail sales of consumer goods indicates that
liberalization of the laws relating to cottage industries, and the wide-
spread prosecutorial nullification of other criminal statutes, has con-
siderably increased trade in second hand and privately
manufactured household wares.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The October Revolution of 1917 heralded the birth of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Before the October Revolution,
the abolition of private control of the means of production was a
fundamental feature of the Bolshevik political program. In State and
Revolution, Lenin explained his theory that state control of agricul-
ture and manufacture would increase economic efficiency:
This expropriation [of the capitalists] will make itpossible for the productive
forces to develop to a tremendous extent. And when we see how incredibly
capitalism is already retarding this development, when we see how much
progress could be achieved on the basis of the level of technique already
[Vol. 16:49
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attained, we are entitled to say with the fullest confidence that the expropria-
tion of the capitalists will inevitably result in an enormous development of
the productive forces of human society.
2
Lenin presided over the expropriation of the capitalists, but his death
in 1924 left the task of inaugurating a system of national economic
planning to Stalin. The government nationalized all land and all
enterprises employing more than five workers immediately after the
October Revolution,3 but did not introduce collective farming or
centrally planned industrial production until 1928.4 The centralized,
state controlled economy which Stalin created during the 1930s
allowed the Communist party to accumulate immense amounts of
capital, which it used to build the country's basic industries at the
expense of production of consumer goods. At Stalin's death in 1953
the Soviet Union possessed a mighty base of heavy industry, but had
minimal capacity for producing household goods or clothing, or for
assuring a balanced diet for its people.5
Khrushchev tried to reform the economy by redesigning the sys-
tem of planning. He substituted regional planning organs, which
controlled all types of production within their districts, for central
ministries, which had supervised all production in the nation within
individual industries.6 Khrushchev also tried to increase productiv-
ity through political education that was intended to instill selfless
motivation in the populace.7 Khrushchev believed that an individ-
ual truly committed to the "construction of Communism" should
shun individual farming, cottage industry, and the desire to accumu-
late personal possessions.8 Legislation during Khrushchev's tenure
reduced the size of private agricultural plots,9 while newspaper arti-
2. V.I. LENIN, 33 POLNOE SOBRANIE SOCHINENII 96 (1917).
3. On October 27, 1917 the Bolshevik government placed all trade in Moscow and
Petrograd under the control of the city soviets. I Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti No. 20 (1917).
In June of 1918, a government decree prohibited the purchase, sale, or lease of any enter-
prise or business without the permission of the People's Commissariat of Trade and Pro-
duction. II Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti No. 270 (1918).
4. See M. LEwIN, RussIAN PEASANTS AND SOVIET POWER 446-514 (1975) for excel-
lent discussions of agricultural collectivization.
5. In September, 1953 the Communist Party Central Committee adopted a resolu-
tion noting that "the needs of consumption cannot be fully satisfied by the socialized
economy." quoted in R. KHALFINA, PRAvo LicHNoi SOBSTVENNOSTI GRAZHDAN SSSR
127 (1955).
6. See R. MEDVEDEV AND Z. MEDVEDEV, KHRUSHCHEV: THE YEARS IN POWER
104-05 (1976).
7. N. KHRUSHCHEV, 0 KOMMUNISTICHESKOM VOsPITANii 61 (1964).
8. Id at 155. Khrushchev said, "In Communism, people should be free from
attraction to private property, from egoism, from self-seeking, from everything that hin-
ders people from living in Communism." Id at 96.
9. Although Khrushchev initially eased the restrictions on private agriculture, by
reducing taxes on income derived from household plots in the summer of 1953, see R.
MEDVEDEV & Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 6, at 34, in 1961 he encouraged collective farms
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des criticised acquisitive tendencies.10 Khrushchev asserted that his
program was not antithetical to a rising standard of living for con-
sumers. He argued that generous public services could replace per-
sonal ownership of property." He failed to convince other political
leaders, however, that moral incentives could replace material
reward as a stimulus to production. 12 His assault on the concept of
personal property was probably a major cause of the political pres-
sures that led to his premature retirement in 1964.
Brezhnev and Kosygin reversed Khrushchev's attempts at
reform, and legitimized material incentives. Legislation enacted
since 1965 has authorized government ministries to reward enter-
prises that exceed their targets under the National Economic Plan,
and permitted industrial managers to grant bonuses to especially
productive workers. 13 The new material incentives have led to an
increase in personal disposable income. 14 The production of food
and consumer goods, however, has not increased sufficiently to
absorb the increase in consumer income. Poor harvests have become
a chronic problem, and the state controlled press, traditionally
uncritical of government policy, frequently expresses concern about
the poor quality and meagre quantity of household goods that are
available in shops.15
In the mid-1970s the Soviet leadership realized that material
incentives would not elicit a greater commitment from the work
force unless consumers could translate their buying power into a bet-
ter standard of living. The leadership also may have feared that the
augmented purchasing power of the people would result in political
discontent if it was not matched by an increased supply of goods and
to reduce the size of personal plots. See S. SAWICm, SOVIET LAND AND HOUSING LAW
87-88 (1977).
10. F. Polozkov, Bor'ba s Funeiadsami i Stiazhateliaml; 1961 SOTSIALISTICHESKAIA
ZAKoNNoST' 28 (No. 3).
11. N. KHRUSHCHEV, supra note 7, at 165.
12. Soviet political leaders other than Khrushchev did not denigrate the importance
of personal property during this period. At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, in 1961,
Kosygin remarked, "It is necessary to expand the retail trade network by all possible
means, to perfect the forms and methods of trade in the village, to bring to them the same
conditions which exist in state trade in the cities." A. KOSYGIN, IZBRANNYE REMC I
STAT'I 127 (1974).
13. V. LAPTEV, KHOZIAISTVENNOE PRAVO 114 (1967).
14. According to the government, personal income has increased almost 50% in the
past decade. Pravda, Aug. 28, 1982, at 1.
15. In seeking the factors that produce a phenomenon such as [the black market]
one should look beyond [the speculator] himself to our design bureaus and light
industry. Certainly one reason that speculators... can find such a ready mar-
ket for their wares is that so many of our stores offer only outmoded and unat-
tractive goods.
And Why Young Speculators in Scarce Goods?, 29 CURRENT DIGEST OF SOVIET PRESS 6
(Oct. 19, 1977) [hereinafter cited as CDSP].
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services. The state-managed economy, however, could not supply
these extra commodities.
The government acted on its observations concerning consumer
demand by reforming the basic legislation regulating the private use
of property in profit making activity. The legislative reforms were
aimed at handicrafts and private farming. A statute enacted in 1976
removed many forms of handicrafts and artisan activities from a list
of forbidden professions.' 6 In addition, the 1977 Constitution com-
mitted the government to assist private farming. 17 In the realm of
agriculture, where the failures of the state controlled economy had
been most dramatic, the scope of legal reform was extensive.
Although legislation enacted after 1977 indicates that the political
leadership has remained committed to innovation in the area of pri-
vate agriculture,' 8 reforms in the laws governing private manufac-
ture and the provision of services have been more tentative. In the
private manufacture and services areas, national leaders have pre-
ferred to ease restrictions by encouraging prosecutors to ignore viola-
tions of the criminal laws regulating trade.
The reforms in private agriculture and manufacture, regardless
of whether they achieved their goals, suggest a tacit admission by the
government that the planned economy has failed to satisfy the needs
of the people:
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the draftsmen of the 1977 Constitution
have shelved [the original Bolshevik] scenario. The language of the charter
plainly concedes that the actual course of events does not seem to have fol-
lowed the anticipated pattern and conveys the impression that the leadership
has chosen to reconcile itself to a much more prosaic reality. 19
By constitutionally expanding the ability of individuals to use prop-
erty for private purposes, the government admitted that private pro-
duction of essential goods is not merely a temporary expedient in the
development of Communist society. Productive activity by private
individuals is a fundamental principal of "mature socialism. ' '20 This
modification of the right to control property is significant as an adap-
tation of Soviet Marxist ideology, even apart from any accompany-
ing changes in sub-constitutional legislation, or in the practices of
the local governments, police, and courts in implementing the new
16. Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR, May 3, 1976, SP SSSR 1976, No. 7, st. 39.
For a discussion of the list of forbidden professions, see infra notes 141-54 and accompa-
nying text.
17. U.S.S.R. Const. (1977).
18. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
19. Ginsburgs and Pomorski, supra note 1, at 30.
20. "The theoretical basis of all ideological-educational work in contemporary con-
ditions is the conception of mature socialism developed by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union." Pravda, Jul. 30, 1982, at 2.
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constitutional right.21
The new constitutional provisions on the use of private property
for production represent a departure from traditional Soviet policy
and ideology. The extent of that departure is suggested by examin-
ing the previous constitution. The Soviet Constitution of 1936
authorized the allocation of small parcels of land to peasant house-
holds. The text specified, however, that peasants were to employ this
land for "personal use," and thereby implicitly precluded the sale of
surplus agricultural produce.22 Elsewhere in the Constitution of
1936, the legislature authorized a "small-scale private economy of
individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on personal labor.123
The 1936 Constitution was ambiguous about the right of individuals
to sell the products of their personal husbandry and manufacture. A
peasant who observed the contemporary practices of the courts and
the prosecutor's office with regard to the Constitution almost cer-
tainly would have abstained from private production for sale.2 4 In
contrast, the 1977 Constitution states that the Soviet Union "permits
individual labor in handicrafts, farming, the provision of services for
the public and other forms of activity based exclusively on the per-
sonal work of individual citizens and members of their families. ' 25
The fundamental law also obligates the state and collective farms to
"provide assistance to citizens in working their small holdings. '2 6
One Soviet commentator states that the new Constitution
employs a "broader formula" to define the right of individuals to use
property for private production:2 7 "The legislation reflected funda-
mental changes in Soviet society occuring in the period after the
21. For example, E.B. Pashukanis, the most influential Soviet legal theorist of the
1920s, wrote of the aim of the Communist Party to abolish "the market bond," that is,
contractual exchange, and to construct a "single planned economy," a society in which,
in Marx's words, "man shall comprehend and organize his individual forces as social
forces." Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY 178-79 (1951).
22. USSR Const. art. 7, para. 2 (1936).
23. Id art. 9.
24. See 1929 SUDEBNAIA PRAKTiKA 2 (No. 1), (A Report of the Civil Cassation Col-
lege of the Soviet Union's Supreme Court, urging local judges to scrutinize rural eco-
nomic activity more closely.) and 1930 SUDEBNAIA PRAKTiKA 6 (No. 9), (A Report of the
Supreme Court on -the local Soviets' practice of confiscating income producing equip-
ment.) On August 22, 1932 the Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme
Soviet amended article 107 of the Criminal Code, which prohibited any "purchase and
resale by private persons of the produce of agriculture and articles of mass consumption
for the purpose of profit." The statute permitted prosecutors to attack virtually any sale
of property. Many prosecutors took advantage of this latitude. 1934 Sovetskaia Iustitsiia
3, 24.
25. USSR Const. art. 17, (1977).
26. Id art. 13.
27. Tagunov, Lichnoepodsobnoe khoziaisvo i individual'naia trudovaia deialetel'nost"
1981 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAvo 7, 129 [hereinafter cited as S.G.iP.].
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adoption of the 1936 Constitution, especially changes in economic
conditions and the social structure. ' 28 These fundamental changes
seem to include a recognition by policy makers that the planned
economy has not been satisfying the needs of the Soviet people, and
an acquiesence by Soviet leaders in the widespread popular aspira-
tion for greater economic freedom.29 The Soviet leadership no
longer determines the propriety of a rule of law by ascertaining its
position in the development of a future classless society. It asks,
according to Brezhnev, whether the legal institution "performs a use-
ful role at present in our economy."' 30 The expanded legal capacity
to engage in private economic activity is unlikely to foster attitudes
conducive to Communist development, yet it is "objectively neces-
sary" Brezhnev said, "because the quantity of produce grown in the
socialized economy of collective farms and state farms is presently
insufficient to satisfy the needs of the population.
31
PRIVATE AGRICULTURE: LEGAL REFORMS AND THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION
According to one Soviet analyst, at least one hundred million
people in the Soviet Union currently fulfill part of their nutritional
needs through personal agriculture. 32 In the Belorussian Republic,
for example, personal husbandry is responsible for approximately
17%, by value, of all agricultural produce.33 Six percent of all crops
are grown privately;34 however, peasants grow 60% of all potatoes
and 40% of all vegetables in their personal plots. 35 Peasants also
produce 40%, by weight, of the republic's meat, 68% of the eggs and
39% of the milk.36
Soviet commentators no longer denigrate the economic and
social importance of private agriculture. Bolshevik ideology tradi-
tionally regarded private husbandry as inimical to the objectives of a
collectivist society, and Soviet leaders from Lenin to Khrushchev
devised various methods of education, persuasion, and coercion for
28. Id
29. Id Other Soviet commentators also have noted the expanded ability to use prop-
erty for private purposes which the 1977 Constitution permits. Kozug, Sover-
shensivovanie pravovogo repulirovaniia lichnogo podsobnogo khoziaistva grazhdan, 1981
S.G.iP. 8, 37; Tolstoi, Konstitutsiia SSSR ipravo sobsivennosti 1978 S.G.iP. 7, 13; Ruba-
nov, Konstitutsionnye osnovyprava lichnoi sobstvennosti v SSSR, 1981 S.G.iP. 4, 29.
30. Tagunov, supra note 27, at 130 (quoting Brezhnev).
31. G.LA. KUZNETSOV, SOTSIAL'NO-EKONOMICHESKIE PROBLEMY SOVETSKOI DER-
EVNI 133 (1977).
32. Stepanko, Problemy zemlepol'zovaniia grazhdan, 1977 PRAVOVEDENHE 1, 56.
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id
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divorcing the peasantry from their personal plots.3 7 Today, how-
ever, the official ideology encourages private agricultural production:
"It is important to create a social climate in the locales in which
people will see that they perform a service useful to the state by
growing livestock and fowl in their personal husbandry."38
Soviet legislative and administrative authorities have begun to
implement the provision of the 1977 Constitution that requires col-
lective farms to assist peasants in their personal agriculture. New
statutes and regulations authorize collective farms to provide indi-
viduals with various types of economic assistance.3 9 The farms may
now give a milk cow to a young family to encourage the family to
remain on the collective farm rather than to relocate to an industrial
region. 4° The farm manager may divert money from the material
incentive fund of the farm to assist individuals in their private agri-
culture.4' Ordinarily the manager would use this money to reward
workers for their contribution to the collectivized sector. New regu-
lations permit the collective farm to construct barns to house the per-
sonal cattle of its members. 42 The government also has instructed
37. The Soviet government expropriated the produce of private agriculture during
the Civil War. Samuel Kucherov wrote that "during the period of War Communism
[1918-1920] . . . the attempt was made to install socialism with one stroke." Kucherov,
Property in the Soviet Union, 11 Am. J. COMP. L. 376, 378 (1962). Lenin also attempted
to pursuade the peasantry to abandon private enterprise in favor of cooperatives. V.I.
LENIN, ON COOPERATION, THE LENIN ANTHOLOGY 709 (R.C. Tucker ed. 1975). Stalin
ordered the collectivization of agriculture in 1928, virtually terminating private agricul-
ture. A regulation enacted in 1932 limited a peasant's ability to engage in personal agri-
culture by establishing minimum amounts of time which peasants were required to
devote to the work of the collective farm. Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii
Pravitel'stva SSSR (1932) No. 62, st. 360. Additional regulations promulgated in 1942
authorized criminal penalties for violations of these minimum work hours. Id 1942 No.
4, st. 61.
In 1960 Khrushchev informed the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet that "conditions will be
created under which the role of individual plots will fall off, they will, evidently, lose
their importance for the kolkhozes." Kucherov, supra, at 382 (quoting Khrushchev).
Khrushchev then reduced the size of private plots. See SAWICKI, supra note 9, at 87-88.
38. Tagunov, supra note 27, at 131. Another example of the current ideology
appeared in Pravda:
[L]ife severely condemns any haste in social practice as ignorance of objective
conditions. One example in particular was the "attack" on small holdings and
the personal subsidiary economy at the beginning of the '60s. Not only the eco-
nomic irrationality but also the "absence of prestige" associated with working on
small holdings was maintained. As a result, people began to buy in shops arti-
cles of consumption which they had formerly produced themselves."
Pravda, July 30, 1982, at 2.
39. See Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR, Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR
No. 6, st. 37 § 8; Ukazaniia o poriadke ucheta skota i ptitsy, 1982 Biulleten' Norma-
tivnykh Aktov 3, 4. See also infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
40. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR No. 6,
st. 37.
41. Id at § 19.
42. 1978 SP SSSR 298, 311 (No. 15).
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collective farms to include in their annual financial plans sufficient
reserves of grain to ensure that the farms may sell cattle feed to peas-
ants, and to maintain enough draft animals to assist individual farm-
ers with tilling and hauling.43 The farm also may enter contracts
with the state agricultural assistance bureau44 to provide pesticides
for the personal plots of peasants. 45
The government has instructed the State Bank to finance this
program of agricultural assistance. A 1981 statute authorized the
bank to extend loans to collective farms in order to fund farm man-
agers' programs for the purchase of tools, animals, and supplies by
individual farmers.46 Regulations adopted in 1982 expanded the
obligation of the State Bank to assist private farming. The Bank
now may loan money to collective farms to finance purchases of veg-
etables, cattle, and fowl produced by the personal husbandry of col-
lective farm members.4 7 The regulation instructs the State Bank to
make these loans to collective farms "irrespective of the status of
their accounts under earlier loans."'48 These instructions to the State
Bank illustrate the government's concerns regarding the failures of
Soviet collective agriculture, and the newly expanded role of private
production. The government has not only legitimized private agri-
cultural production, it also has begun to finance individual farming.
Under the Soviet system of federalism, 49 union republics have
the authority to enact special legislation pertaining to agriculture if
those regulations are consistent with national or "all-union" statutes.
In March of 1979 the Latvian Republic approved an experimental
change in the planning practices of collective farms in two districts.50
Every adult residing in these districts, regardless of his or her profes-
sion, now may enter into a contract with a collective farm to raise
and sell livestock to the farm. The farm provides calves or other
young animals, veterinary services, fodder, mixed feed, and pastur-
age to the individual free of charge or at a reduced price. When the
animals have matured, the farm purchases them at the state-estab-
43. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR No. 6,
st. 37, § 21.
44. Sel'khoztekhnika.
45. Bashmakov, Lichnoe podsobnoe khoziaistvo grazhdan, 1979 SOTSIALISTICHES-
KAIA ZAKONNOST' 7, 36.
46. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR, Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR No. 6,
St. 37, § 12.
47. Ukazaniia o poriadke ucheta skota i ptitsy, 1982 Biulleten' Normativnykh Aktov
3,4.
48. 1982 Biulleten' Normativnykh Aktov 3, 4 § 11.
49. For a general discussion of the division of power between the central government
and the union republics, see J. HOUGH AND M. FAINSOD, How THE SOVIET UNION IS
GOVERNED 480-517 (1979).
50. The Rural Household's Potential, 32 CDSP 17 (Dec. 17, 1980).
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fished agricultural procurement price. According to the press, the
fifty-five collective farms participating in the experiment are assured
a supply of mature cattle each year, and many individuals who could
not otherwise work in animal husbandry are able to earn supplemen-
tal incomes. 51
Academic commentaries urging the adoption of additional leg-
islation to facilitate further forms of assistance by collective farms to
private agriculture have appeared in Soviet publications. One com-
mentator suggested that collective farms permit privately owned cat-
tle to graze in sections of the farm where fodder cannot be harvested
mechanically. 52 He also suggested that farms make available their
resources for artificial insemination and their information on selec-
tive breeding.53 As participants in policy debates in the Soviet
Union often publicly express their point of view by permitting state-
ments with which they agree to be published in the press, the appear-
ance of these suggestions may indicate that the Party leadership is
debating questions concerning additional methods of assisting
agriculture.
Newspaper reports on the agricultural crisis indicate, however,
that few collective farms have implemented the legislatively author-
ized assistance programs. Journalists report that assistance to pri-
vate agriculture is sufficiently unusual to be noteworthy. Complaints
about the role of collective farms in private agriculture are generally
more common than praise. A typical letter published by Pravda in
1978 criticized farms for selling an inadequate number of chicks and
suckling pigs to individuals.5 4 At some farms, however, there are
exceptions. For instance, the farm "Bolshevik" in Minsk reportedly
sells hay to individuals at 20-25% of the market price.55 The farm
also maintains summer pasturage for the peasants' personal cattle.56
Another collective farm built a barn to house 100 privately owned
cattle,57 and the farm employs one full time worker to tend and milk
the cattle.58 Peasants pay a small fee to house their stock in this
cooperative facility.59 The press reports that this program has saved
peasants an average of 750 man hours per year.60
51. Id.
52. G.IA. KUZNETSOV, supra note 31, at 144.
53. Id
54. From Livestock Section to Consumer: For the General Good, 30 CDSP 21 (Apr.
19, 1978).
55. Aspects of Change in the Countryside, 30 CDSP 8 (May 31, 1978).
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id at 8-9.
60. Id at 9.
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In addition to authorizing collective farms to assist private agri-
culture, the government has sponsored a limited debate in the press
on the possibilities of expanding private rights to own animals. Indi-
viduals now may own cattle for their personal use, and for sale to
consumer cooperatives, collective farms, or state procurement agen-
cies. 61 Although no national laws restrict the number of cattle that
an individual may own, local regulations and the charters of the col-
lective farms may restrict cattle ownership. In late 1977, the Council
of Ministers of the Soviet Union instructed all union republics to
examine the regulations of their cities to determine whether prohibi-
tions on the ownership of stock in urban areas were necessary to the
maintenance of acceptable sanitation.62 The Council of Ministers
also ordered the republics to study the regulations of collective
farms.63 In addition, the republics were to authorize an increase in
the number of livestock that an individual farmer might own if the
amount of land available for private grazing was sufficient to justify
such an increase.64 This instruction was a signal to the press that
debate on the expansion of private ownership of cattle was permissi-
ble. The debate began with a letter from a machinist, printed in
Pravda on January 3, 1978.65 The writer suggested that more land
be allocated to industrial enterprises for the use of employees who
desire to raise cattle.66 He also urged the encouragement of animal
husbandry in the suburbs.67 Other writers criticized local authorities
for constructing high rise apartment buildings that have no unused,
adjacent land, instead of single family dwellings with adjoining pas-
turage. 68 A 1981 statute was the only apparent result of this debate.
It permitted individuals to own cattle in excess of the norms of the
collective farm charter if the cattle were yearlings that the farmer
was raising under contract for subsequent sale to the collective
farm. 69
In addition to the measures which the Soviet government has
introduced for the purpose of stimulating private agricultural pro-
duction, national authorities have attempted to facilitate the efforts
61. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR No. 6,
st. 37, § 2.
62. 12 Resheniia Partii i Pravitel'stva po Khoziaistuennym Voprosam § 2, 104, 106
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Resheniia Partii].
63. Id
64. Id
65. Pravda Considers the Meat Shortage, 30 CDSP I (Feb. 1, 1978).
66. Id
67. Id
68. From Livestock Section to Consumer: For the General Good, 30 CDSP 21 (Apr.
19, 1978).
69. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR, Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR No. 6,
st. 37.
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of peasants to sell their produce. The private sale of goods is a more
sensitive political problem for the Soviet leadership than private pro-
duction, however, because the unrestricted sale of farm products
would undermine government controls on retail prices, and
encourage private accumulation of capital. To retain its control of
the retail market, the government has not made new avenues for the
commercial disposition of farm products accessible, and has
attempted instead to make traditional means of sale more attractive
to the peasantry.
The Soviet peasant has a number of ways, both legal and extra-
legal, to dispose of his produce. He and his family may consume all
the food they raise. Alternatively, peasants may effect private sales
or sell to middlemen for resale. In addition, they may sell their pro-
duce to governmental or quasi-governmental purchasers such as
consumer cooperatives, collective farms, or state procurement agen-
cies. In order to encourage the delivery of privately produced food
to urban areas without losing control of the retail market, the leader-
ship has preferred to enhance the attractiveness of governmental and
quasi-governmental purchasing agents.70 The Party's alternative
policy is to encourage private sales in urban markets by the produc-
ing peasants. 71 Sales to middlemen, on the other hand, are illegal
because they allow individuals whom the government cannot control
to accumulate economic power.72
In recent years the Soviet government has prodded the con-
sumer cooperatives and state procurement agencies, which tradition-
ally have purchased food stuffs only from collective farms, to begin
purchasing the surplus produce of private agriculture. 73 Because the
success of this program initially depends upon peasants producing
more food than their own families can consume, in 1981 the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and Soviet Union Council of
Ministers jointly adopted a resolution designed to foster assistance
from local officials to private agriculture. The resolution urged local
Party and Soviet agricultural organizations, trade unions, and direc-
tors of collective farms to "develop broad organizational and explor-
atory work among the population and assist them so that every
family in the village has a garden and is raising livestock and fowl
70. Id preamble. Urban markets facilitate the availability of produce to consumers,
however, the government cannot control the price of vegetables, milk, or other items in
private sales.
7 1. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
72. RSFSR Criminal Code § 154 defines the crime of "speculation" as "the purchase
and resale of goods or other objects of consumption with the aim of profit." For a discus-
sion of speculation, see infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
73. Postanvlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR, No. 6,
st. 37, § 4.
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and in so far as possible every family has a cow."'74 The Party recog-
nized that private farmers probably would not supply urban areas
with food if their rural neighbors were in need. The resolution also
encouraged quasi-governmental purchasing organizations to explore
a "fuller use of the potential for production by citizens in increasing
the supply of the produce of agriculture and animal husbandry."75
A commentator from Belorussia asserted that local soviets in his
republic have been "developing supplemental means for better
organizing the purchase from individual collective farmers, workers,
professionals and other citizens of their surplus agricultural
produce. '76
The government also has authorized its administrative branches
to offer financial advantages to peasants who sell their surplus pro-
duce to a governmental agency.77 Peasants who enter contracts with
consumer cooperatives are entitled to purchase farm implements,
building materials, and other manufactured goods from the co-op.78
These articles are in chronically short supply in the Soviet Union,
and if consumer co-ops actually were able to keep them in stock, this
regulation would offer peasants a mighty incentive to sell crops and
milk to the state. In addition, in 1981 the national procurement
agency Tsentrosoiuz adopted a model contract for use by its local
affiliates.79 A citizen who enters into such a contract with the pro-
curement agency at the beginning of the growing season is entitled to
advance payments for the livestock and the crops he agrees to
deliver.80 If the individual fails to deliver, he is obligated to repay
the advance plus 1% annual interest.8 '
Commentaries and letters in Soviet newspapers have proposed
other forms of cooperation between state purchasing agents and pri-
vate farmers. One author urged the government to commission state
procurement agencies to transport peasants' surplus produce to
urban markets, and to attempt to sell the goods on the peasants'
behalf.82 According to the author, 6,500 collective farms maintain
urban markets, at which their members sell their surplus crops, milk,
and meat.83 If state agencies were to transport and sell these wares,
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Stepanko, supra note 32, at 58.
77. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR No. 6,
st. 37, at preamble.
78. Bashmakov, supra note 45, at 36.
79. 1982 Biulleten' Normativnykh Aktov 3, 33.
80. The advance is 50% of the contract price for livestock and 30% for crops. Id,
81. Id
82. Why Price Controls Don't Work at Farm Markets, and What Does, 31 CDSP 18
(Mar. 21, 1979).
83. Id
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the peasants could remain at home to tend the fields. The author
concludes that the reduction in man-hours expended in transporting
and selling the goods should yield lower prices. Another writer
echoed these ideas in suggesting that state catering organizations
located at factories and schools purchase directly from peasants.
8 4
The measures that the Soviet government has adopted in recent
years to encourage private agricultural production and to facilitate
the distribution of peasants' surplus crops, milk, and meat presently
are not succeeding. Official sources explain some of the reasons for
this failure.85 Government documents contain complaints that
excessive bureaucratization in local procurement organizations, con-
sumer cooperatives, and collective farms has prevented these agen-
cies from responding to the new policy. A joint resolution of the
Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers criticized "dis-
crete executive committees,"8' 6 "collective farm directors and other
state and cooperative enterprises and organizations for underesti-
mating the potential" of private production.8 7 "In a number of
regions," the resolution lamented, "agricultural production on pri-
vate parcels has been curtailed."88 The resolution asserted that some
collective farms refuse to sell individuals grain and fodder for their
animals, or to supply grazing space for personal stock even if there is
sufficient pasture.8 9 In 1981, the Central Committee and Council of
Ministers criticized local governments, trade unions, and collective
farm directors for failing to implement the government's enabling
legislation concerning assistance to peasants. 90 Political leaders
scolded collective farm directors in particular, because of their
"administrative interference" with peasants who were raising live-
stock.91 Collective farm directors may attempt to coerce peasants to
sell their cattle, or threaten the peasants with sanctions for devoting
too much time to private agriculture. 92
The leadership also has criticized those agencies whose new
vocation is purchasing crops from peasants. According to the 1981
resolution, "[s]erious deficiencies" exist in the work of the Ministry
of Meat and Milk Production, the Ministry of Food Production, and
84. How Should Private Plot Output Be Sold?, 32 CDSP 8 (Sept. 3, 1980).
85. See infra notes 85-116 and accompanying text.
86. This is a euphemism which means that a problem is widespread.
87. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov v SSSR, Sept. 14, 1977, 12
Resheniia Partii 104.
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR, Jan. 8, 1981, SP SSSR No. 6,
st. 37.
91. Id at § 4. "Administrative interference" is official abuse of power or intimida-
tion in Soviet parlance.
92. Id
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the Central Procurement Agency. 93 These agencies failed to
purchase significant amounts of the peasants' surplus produce, and
also had neglected to organize local purchasing offices. 94 In a 1980
article, the Soviet press reported that state procurement agencies
were purchasing less than 5% of the products of private agriculture.95
The article asserted that consumer co-ops also assign low priority to
purchases from individuals, and frequently refuse to buy any pri-
vately grown food stuffs. 96
It appears that local governments also have failed to supply a
greater part of the urban population with private agricultural sur-
plus. Local soviets control the urban market space alloted for the
sale of privately produced goods to collective farms.97 The soviets
have shown little interest in providing, maintaining, or cleaning this
market space, and they have generally declined to assist peasants in
transporting goods to market.98 "[Aill of this cannot fail to reflect
negatively on providing to workers in industrial centers the produce
of agriculture and on the tempo of growth of personal income of the
rural population." 99
Local soviets also seem to be administering ineptly the program
for allocating unused land to industrial enterprises. Under this pro-
gram, state manufacturing firms receive land for their employees to
use for cultivating crops and raising cattle. 1°° In 1982, the Central
Committee of the Latvian Communist Party complained that, three
years before, the government of that union republic had set aside
4,000 hectare of land for the agricultural use of industrial enter-
prises, yet not one hectare had been cultivated.' 0 '
A realistic appraisal of Soviet affairs supplements the govern-
ment's explanation for the failure of its new agricultural program.
The chaotic condition of legislation promulgated by the central gov-
emnment is one reason for the unresponsiveness of collective farms,
procurement agencies, and local governments. Even well-inten-
tioned Soviet officials, earnestly attempting to determine their legal
duties, never can be certain that they are acting properly. Numerous
central authorities promulgate statutes, decrees, instructions, and
93. Id preamble.
94. Id
95. How Should Private Plot Output Be Sold?, 32 CDSP 8 (Sept. 3, 1980).
96. Id
97. See G.IA. KuZNETSOV, supra note 31, at 139.
98. See id
99. Id
100. Pravda, Jun. 18, 1982, at 2.
101. Id
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regulations, often without repealing prior actions.10 2 Furthermore,
they do so without explaining the relationship between such rules.
Legislation pertaining to public procurement of private produce is
plagued by overlaps, omissions, and uncertainty. 10 3 The authority of
some procurement agencies appears to conflict with the powers of
other bodies. 104No one is certain who adjudicates disputes between
different agencies. Purchases by procurement agencies are regulated
by at least three decrees of the Council of Ministers, 0 5 a decree of
the State Committee on Prices, °6 and the Model Contract of the
Central Procurement Agency.10 7
Implementing agencies also may be unresponsive because of
their hostility to performing the new tasks that the central govern-
ment has assigned them. Procurement agencies, for example, per-
form tasks assigned to them by the National Economic Plan.10 8
Traditionally, they have purchased food stuffs only from collective
farms to fulfill their "plan." The government's instructions to
purchase from individual farmers, as well as from collective
farms, 0 9 requires the procurement agencies to spread their scarce
manpower resources to perform new tasks. Under the Soviet system
of material incentives, the agency staff receives bonuses only when it
fulfills its plan. 10 Local procurement agencies may consider
purchase negotiations with directors of collective farms to be more
cost effective than dealings with individual peasants.
In addition, relations between procurement agencies and the
peasantry traditionally have been antagonistic rather than coopera-
tive. During the Civil War and the early 1930s, the beginning years
of collective agriculture, state procurement agencies seized the farm-
ers' grain, leaving these individuals little or none of their produce for
102. In addition to the Soviet Union Council of Ministers, and the Communist Party
Central Committee, the Soviet Union Ministry of Procurement, the State Committee on
Prices, the Central Procurement Agency, and other government departments promulgate
regulations in this area.
103. For example, none of the legislation pertaining to procurement provides for cen-
tral planning of state purchases from peasants.
104. State procurement agencies, the Ministry of Meat and Milk Production, and the
Ministry of Food Production have overlapping authority in this area.
105. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS SSSR i Soveta Ministrov SSSR, Jan. 8, 1981; Posta-
novlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR, Apr. 23, 1970, No. 278, SP SSSR 1970 No. 8., st. 63;
Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR, Jul. 31, 1970, No. 627, SP SSSR 1970, No. 14, st.
115.
106. Postanovlenie Goskomtsen SSSR Nov. 15, 1977 No. 549, 1978 Biulleten' Norma-
tivnykh Aktov 6, 23.
107. Tsentrosoiuz Model Contract, 1982 Biulleten' Normativnykh Aktov 3, 33.
108. Resheniia Partii, supra note 67, § 1 at 104.
109. What is Private Farming's Proper Role, 32 CDSP 8 (Mar. 5, 1980).
110. Polozhenie ob obrazovanii i ispol'zovanii rezervov po fondam ekonomicheskogo
stimulirovaniia ministerstv (vedomstv).
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personal use. The government prosecuted peasants who hid grain,
and generally meted out summary punishment."' Subsequently,
millions of people died in a famine c- d by the actions of state
procurement officials. 1 2 Even though state procurement agencies
and the peasantry no longer are engaged in a life and death struggle,
their relationship is not one that would engender trust of officials
among the farmers. Procurement agencies are the only entities
legally entitled to buy the output of collective farms, and the price
that they offer is fixed.' 1 3 The failure of a farm to deliver the output
required by contract, or to deliver it on time, subjects the collective
to both damages and fines." 4 By law, the agency also is entitled to
demand specific performance when a farm does not satisfy its con-
tractual obligation with its own output, even though the farm cannot
purchase covering goods from any other source because of the stric-
tures of the planned economy." 5 The agency thus has considerable
power over the peasants.
This tradition of antagonism inhibits the agency staff from
negotiating directly with individual peasants, and makes it easier for
the peasantry to distrust state procurement. A proposal made by one
Pravda reader suggesting that peasants deliver their surplus milk and
eggs to these agencies for subsequent resale in urban areas is laugha-
ble. 116 The typical Soviet peasant would prefer to waste a working
day walking to the village to sell her basket of eggs, than to accept a
sum fixed by the State Committee on Pricing and proffered by the
procurement agency." 7
The failure of collective farms to follow the dictates of the 1977
Constitution and implementing legislation, and assist peasants in
their personal agriculture probably is explained by a conflict of inter-
est in collective farm management. Directors enter annual procure-
ment contracts with the state on behalf of their farms." 8 Career
advancement opportunities in the collective farm area depend, in
part, upon the directors' efficacy in leading the farms to the fulfill-
I11. See generally M. LEwIN, supra note 4, at 514-52; R. TUCKER, STALIN AS REVO-
LUTIONARY 407-20 (1973).
112. M. LEWIN, supra note 4, at 214-44.
113. 1982 Builleten' Normativnykh Aktov 3, 33.
114. R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code §§ 217, 219, 221.
115. All produce of state owned enterprises is allocated by the plan. The produce of
cooperative organizations is purchased by the state. See e.g., Polozhenie o Postavkakh
Produktsii Proizvodstvenno-tekhicheskogo Naznacheniia, SP SSSR 1969, No. 11, st. 64,§ 6.
116. Why Price Controls Don't Work at Farm Markets, and What Does, 31 CDSP 18
(Mar. 21, 1979).
117. See J. HOUGH & M. FAINSOD, supra note 49, at 179-80, for a description of the
alienation of the peasantry from the regime in recent years.
118. A. NovE, THE SOViET ECONOMY 99-103 (1968).
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ment of these contracts, and in increasing the output of the collec-
tives from year to year. Directors probably believe that the
development of private agriculture by collective farm members will
distract the peasants from their obligations to the organization.
Increased private farming may diminish the number of hours that
peasant farmers devote to the collective crop. In addition, income
from private farming also reduces the kolkhozniks' dependence on
their share of the collective farms' profits, and may therefore dimin-
ish the commitment of the peasants to working on the collective.
These factors could lead to diminishing productivity for the collec-
tive farms. Thus, directors may be reluctant to implement a policy
which weakens their ability to accomplish their own objectives.
Finally, some members of the policy making elite in the Soviet
Union do not support the government's program to expand agricul-
tural production through private farming. For many years the
Soviet government pursued a policy of suppressing all profit-making
uses of private property. There are undoubtedly many officials who
remain relentlessly opposed to private economic activity because of
the threat it poses to the economic 'power of the government. In
addition, some officials are committed to building a society in which
the people's economic motivation is the public welfare, rather than
personal profit. The resistance of these officials compounds the
effects of self-interest, mistrust, and bureaucratic inertia which pre-
vent Soviet governmental and quasi-governmental organizations
from assisting small private farmers.
Opposition within the ruling councils to the government's agri-
cultural program surfaces in legislation and in the press, and makes
official pronouncements concerning the program seem somewhat
contradictory. Ruling governmental and Party bodies adopt resolu-
tions that condemn profit seeking among peasants who are farming
small holdings, and simultaneously enact statutes that encourage pri-
vate initiative. For example, in 1977, the year the new Constitu-
tional provisions liberalizing the right to use private property for
profit were adopted, the Central Committee and Council of Minis-
ters instructed the union republics to exercise "strict supervision
through local soviets and agricultural organs of the observance of
existing land legislation and of the regulations of the use of land
alloted to citizens, keeping in mind that such land should be used for
production of agricultural produce and leisure activities and not for
personal enrichment or money grubbing."1 19
Soviet publications contain articles and letters from readers
condemning abuses of the right to engage in private agriculture, and
119. How Should Private Plot Output Be Sold, 32 CDSP 8 (Sept. 3, 1980).
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describing examples of the deleterious effects of free enterprise on
the moral fabric of the nation. The press reported, for example, that
some peasants at the Lenin Collective Farm in Dagestan owned per-
sonal flocks consisting of hundreds of sheep. 120 The writer lamented
that "there is no law to punish people for owning excessive numbers
of private animals." 121 The behavior of those individuals amounted
only to a violation of the rules of the collective farm, 22 and entailed
only a small fine. Another author complained that vegetable grow-
ing in Zaporozhets province was so profitable that thousands of
industrial workers resign their jobs each summer to grow cash crops
in personal greenhouses. 23 Peasants also were slaughtering their
farm animals so as to invest all their capital and time in vegetable
cultivation.' 24 The author asserted that because the residents of
Zaporozhets were following the invisible hand of profit, essential
agricultural and industrial tasks remained unperformed. 125 To rem-
edy this situation, the writer suggested the imposition of a price ceil-
ing for retail sales of vegetables.' 26 Finally, one writer mourned the
moral corruption of Soviet youth through the legitimization of the
quest for profit. 27 The writer cited the fact that farmers use school
children on sumnmer holiday to pick crops, an activity which violates
the Soviet laws prohibiting any use of hired labor in private eco-
nomic activity. 28 The author recognized that the youth of the Soviet
Union should be occupied at productive activity during the summer,
but stated that "no amount of money can measure the damage-
physical, moral and every other kind-that is caused by this sort of
training in private ownership."' 29 The author complained that
despite this violation of the rules against employment of hired labor,
the state prosecutor, the Communist Union of Youth, and the State
Committee on Labor took no interest in the affair, although the mat-
ter was within the jurisdiction of each.' 30
In summary, the Soviet government has adopted several meas-
ures intended to increase private production of food so as to meet the
needs of consumers. Bureaucratic inertia, a tradition of animosity
between the government and the peasantry, and the resistance of
120. Into the Wrong Steppe, 31 CDSP 18 (Sept. 5, 1979).
121. Id
122. See id
123. What is Private Farming's Proper Role, 32 CDSP 8 (Mar. 5, 1980).
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id
127. Children Hired to Pick Private-Plot Watermelons, 31 CDSP 12 (Oct. 10, 1979).
128. Id
129. Id
130. Id
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some individuals in positions of influence relative to the pursuit of
private gain by peasants, however, have hindered the government's
program of agricultural incentives. The following discussion dem-
onstrates that, in contrast to the government's overt attempt to
encourage individual farming with incentives and state assistance,
the government more successfully has employed covert means to
encourage the private supply of goods and services.
HANDICRAFTS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES:
PROSECUTORIAL NULLIFICATION AS POLICY
Nullification of the law is the centerpiece of the Soviet govern-
ment's policy toward the private supply of non-agricultural goods
and services. Although studied indifference by prosecutorial and
administrative departments to violations of the law plays a part in
the government's policy regarding private agriculture, constitutional
and legislative reform has been central to the government's approach
in that area. National leaders and local officials, sympathetic to the
objective of increasing agricultural production through private farm-
ing, ignore many violations of the prohibitions on private business.
This behavior complements the effect of the new regulations, which
permit greater freedom to dispose of produce, and require public
agencies to assist peasants. In contrast, the government has been
hesitant to liberalize formal regulations in the area of private pro-
duction and sale of non-agricultural goods and services. Notwith-
standing this governmental hesitancy, nullification of the law has
resulted in an increase in the supply of handicrafts and services.
The systemic failures that lead to the necessity for private agri-
culture in the Soviet Union also are responsible for the need for a
larger supply of privately produced non-agricultural goods and serv-
ices. The socialized sector is unable to fill the demands of consumers
and absorb the excess savings of individuals. Inadequate supplies of
consumer goods are not as critical to the political system, however,
as food shortages. Moreover, the risk the government takes in per-
mitting private manufacture is much greater than that involved in
encouraging private agriculture. By authorizing a significant
amount of private manufacture, the government would risk losing
control over the supply of raw materials, including wood, plastic,
leather, and building materials. The government also would lose
control of the retail price structure. The most important factor moti-
vating the government's desire to restrain private manufacturing,
however, is the Soviet prohibition on the use of hired labor. The
prohibition on hired labor is a central tenet of Marxist political
thought, and a critical reason for the government's control of the
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labor supply. 3 1 Unless the government permits artisans to employ
persons who are not members of their immediate families, however,
private manufacture will not develop to a significant degree.
Because of this conflict, recent efforts by the government to
encourage private trade in nonagricultural goods have, been much
more modest than its campaign to promote production on private
farms.
The press is replete with articles criticizing the minimal capacity
of the planned economy to supply consumer goods and services. In
1977, for example, a letter writer lamented the condition of new
state-built apartment buildings. The writer asserted that "persons
moving into a new apartments still have to pay enormous sums to
moonlighters or bribes to state workers in order to make their new
dwellings liveable."' 32 In addition, he wrote, "most of [the] new ten-
ants' extra expenses are necessitated by unfinished or shoddy work
on the part of builders."' 33 The author recognized that entrepre-
neurs merely fill a gap in the supply of consumer goods and services
created by the shortcomings of the planned economy. He deplored
the necessity of private carpentry, however, saying, "I have been
brought up to have an antipathy for private entrepreneurs and
would rather see state service employees"' 34 perform these jobs.
Other citizens have urged the government to permit cottage
industries to supply articles which the planned sector of the economy
neglects to produce. The deputy director of a knitwear factory wrote
that "[o]ur society also needs various consumer services that can be
performed in the home. Why do we have so few tailors, for example
. . . and knife sharpeners? They have disappeared entirely."' 135 The
writer observed that a policy of encouraging handicrafts would stim-
ulate production particularly in the decorative arts. 136
131. The Principles of Legislation of the Soviet Union and Union Republics on
Labor, preamble, states "[t]he Great October Socialist Revolution destroyed the system
of exploitation and degradation. After centuries of forced labor for exploiters, the work-
ers received the opportunity to work for themselves, for their own society." Vedomosti
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 1970 No. 29, st. 265. Lenin wrote that socialism would be
both more efficient and less alienating to workers than capitalism. He asserted that soci-
ety would own the means of production, and therefore each worker would direct his
energies toward the public good, eradicating the self-interested character of labor, and
"transforming labor into 'life's prime want." V.I. LENIN, THE STATE AND REVOLUTION,
in THE LENI ANTHOLOGY, supra note 37, at 379.
132. Edik as a Competitor of Slshod State Services, 29 CDSP 16 (June 15, 1977).
133. Id
134. Id at 17.
135. The Virtues o/Hiring People to Work in Their Own Homes, 31 CDSP 15 (Dec. 19,
•1979).
136. Id The field of the decorative arts provides an apt illustration of an area in
which the government has been unable to satisfy consumer desires through the socialized
sector, or to organize the distribution and sale of the wares that privately operating artists
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Recent Soviet commentaries have maintained that private man-
ufacture and privately supplied services are not per se inimical to
socialism. One commentator has stated that "[P]roductive activity
by individuals or a group of people is not only not socially danger-
ous; it is useful."' 137 Nonetheless, the commentator noted, the gov-
ernment must regulate private production of non-agricultural
commodities because of abuses that are common to most forms of
individual manufacture:
The social harm of such activity is the use of valuable articles in which the
state has a strict interest such as grain, flax, hemp, chemicals, etc. Goods
manufactured privately such as linen, rope, butter, flour, and leather, are as a
rule of much worse quality than those manufactured at state enterprises.
People occupied in such activities draw profit to themselves unconnected
with the quality or quantity of work. 138
One authority estimated that the portion of all Soviet workers occu-
pied by private manufacturing and services was 0.1% of the work
force in 1981.139 This figure includes only artisans and
handicraftmen who had registered their occupations with local
authorities, as the law prescribes.' 40 The number of individuals per-
forming useful services whose illegal business activities the govern-
ment is compelled to tolerate is much greater.
Historically, the Soviet Union either has prohibited or regulated
all forms of private manufacturing and all supplies of services. Indi-
viduals lawfully may engage in professions that are not prohibited if
they register with local authorities. 14 1 A list of prohibited occupa-
tions, promulgated by Stalin in 1949, was in effect for many years. 142
These rules, which ostensibly regulated the procedire for "registra-
tion of handicraftsmen and artisans not working in a collective,"
actually imposed criminal sanctions for those engaging in virtually
any nonagricultural economic activity. 143 The statute's reference to
procedures for registration of handicraftsmen was misleading, as the
law forbade almost all conceivable forms of cottage industry. The
create. Many peasants carve and decorate wooden masks, which they may legally sell at
farmers' markets. The Russian Souvenir Experimental Handicrafts Combine once
attempted to organize the collection and distribution of these masks, but the results of
their efforts were of no benefit to either consumers or peasant producers. Red tape
increased the price of these masks by 30% and greatly delayed their sale. Free-Lance
Craftsmen Pose a Problem, 29 CDSP 14 (Dec. 7, 1977).
137. KuRs SOVETSKOOO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA: CHAST' OSOBENNAIA (tom 4), 31 (N.
A. Beliaev, ed. 1978).
138. Id at 148.
139. See Tagunov, supra note 27, at 132.
140. Id
141. Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR, May 3, 1976, SP SSSR 1976, No. 7, st. 39.
142. Postanovlenie, Jun. 30, 1949 (unpublished in official sources); see Ugolovnyi
Kodeks RSFSR (1966).
143. Id
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statute prohibited, among other things, the processing of purchased
grain, fiber goods,144 and chemical compounds. 145 It enjoined the
production for sale of many small personal and household items.146
The section of the statute proscribing the manufacture of
photoreproduction equipment and metal type for printing presses
assisted the government in maintaining its monopoly on the means
of communication.1 47 The government proscribed private processing
for sale of food stuffs and baked goods, as well as the preparation of
alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages. 148 The statute also prohibited
the transportation of passengers or commodities for payment. 49
Finally, the Act of 1949 prohibited "any kind of trade in the form of
purchase and resale or as a middleman and the repair for resale of
purchased articles."'150
The 1949 statute facilitated two types of governmental control
over the population. The list of prohibited professions established
for the government a monopoly on the means of disseminating ideas
and on the use of force. The statute therefore impeded the formation
and execution of nationwide opposition to the policies of the Party.
In addition the government used the statute to monopolize both
manufacture for sale and the supply of services.
In 1976 the government repealed the 1949 legislation and
adopted new national regulations.' 5 ' The government's primary
objective in enacting the new legislation was to retain control of the
means of communication and political resistance, but to permit the
small scale private nonagricultural production of goods and supply
of services. To these ends, the central government now prohibits
fewer professions. This new Ai-Union legislation prohibits the
processing of grain and other food products not grown by the proces-
sor, the manufacture and repair of weapons and explosives, the pro-
duction of devices for duplicating, photocopying, video and audio
reproduction, and printing.' 52 The statute forbids the manufacture
of awards or medals, articles containing precious stones and metals,
chemical and cosmetic goods, poisonous or narcotic articles, and any
144. Id at § 4. These items included hemp, flax, seed, silk, cocoons, tobacco, wool,
yarn, and sheepskin.
145. Id Production of acid, vitriol, soda, blueing, poisonous materials, drying oil, cos-
metics, explosives, and fireworks were included in this prohibition.
146. Id These included clothing, jewelry, footwear, articles made of colored metals,
medals or badges, china, writing pads, envelopes, candles, and articles made of bristle or
woven hair.
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id.
150. Id
151. Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR, May 3, 1976, SP SSSR 1976, No. 7, st. 39.
152. Id at § 2.
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sort of medicine. 153 Treating and dyeing leather, sheepskin, and
skins of fur bearing animals is also proscribed. Finally, the statute
forbids transporting passengers and freight by automotive means for
pay, organizing a holiday hotel, bath house or spectator event, and
manufacturing ikons or other religious utensils.154
The most innovative feature of the new legislation is that it
expands the ability of individuals to use private property for profit
making activity. Only two types of property that a Soviet citizen
legally may own, automobiles and houses, cannot be used for
profit.155 An individual now may manufacture and sell clothing and
prepare food stuffs from home grown crops. These activities are par-
ticularly significant in view of their importance to consumers, the
scarcity of textiles and foodstuffs in the Soviet economy, and the rel-
atively low level of capital and skill required to practice those trades.
Thus, the new statute opens genuine new avenues for cottage
industry.
To avoid discouraging participation in the legal forms of private
economic activity that it wishes to encourage, the government has
adopted a lenient prosecutorial policy towards persons engaged in
prohibited professions.' 56 In a recent book on private commercial
activity, a Soviet author observed that criminal sanctions frequently
are not applied to first offenders. 5 7 Under a statute enacted in 1977,
the court, on its own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecutor,
may suspend the ongoing criminal proceeding, render a special
determination that administrative sanctions are in order, and dismiss
the case without rendering a verdict.'58 Administrative sanctions
may consist of a fine of not more than fifty rubles, corrective labor at
the offender's place of regular employment, or confinement for not
153. Id
154. Id
155. Other possessions, such as metal working tools, cannot be used for professions
such as the manufacture of medals. The use of metal working tools to manufacture
kitchen utensils, for example, is permitted if the artisan registers with the local
government.
156. Note that the laws of each of the union republics prescribe penalties for persons
engaging in proscribed professions. Article 162 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code pro-
vides, for example,
Engaging in a business which is specially prohibited, if such act is not subject to
administrative liability or if committed after an administrative fine has been lev-
ied for such activity, is punished by corrective labor for a period not exceeding
one year or a fine of not more than two hundred rubles.
Id at art. 162, para. 2. Repeat offenders or those employing hired labor in prohibited
businesses are subject to imprisonment not exceeding four years and confiscation of
property. Id
157. V. IA. TATSII, OTVETSTVENNOST' ZA CHASTNOPREDPRINIMATEL'SKAIA DEIATEL-
NOST'I KOMMERCHESKOE POSREDNICHESTVO 57 (1979).
158. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 1977, No. 12, st. 256 (amending
Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR § 50 (1)).
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more than fifteen days.159
The statute authorizing administrative disposition of persons
committing economic crimes permits judicial leniency. The lack of
strong criminal penalties encourages private economic activity.
Because there is no means of determining the extent of black market
activity, however, the actual effect of judicial leniency on the turno-
ver of goods and services remains unknown.
In contrast to the statute of 1949, the 1976 rules on Handicraft-
Artisan Professions set forth procedures for registration of private
business which actually have been implemented. A Soviet citizen
may engage in any business that is not specifically prohibited by stat-
ute. Failure to register a business with the local tax department,
however, will subject an individual to administrative liability.160
The registrant must inform the tax department of the location of the
business and the identity of any family members participating in the
undertaking. 16' An artisan may not employ hired labor. 62 To con-
trol the size of private enterprises, and to prevent the formation of
partnerships and other business associations, the statute forbids the
issuing of registration certificates to two or more unrelated individu-
als who wish to engage in business on the same premises. 63 The
artisan may peddle his wares from town to town if his registration
certificate notes that he is an itinerant craftsman.164
The regulations that implement the 1976 statute permit individ-
uals to engage in several trades without registering. 16 5 A peasant
may prepare and process crops or meat that he grows on his personal
plot, and sell them as baked goods, sausage, meat pies, and the like
without registering as a merchant. 66 In addition, individuals who
perform household services, such as chopping firewood, washing
clothes in their homes without "special equipment," or washing
floors and windows, need not register with local authorities. 67 Indi-
viduals may enter any type of handicrafts or artisan vocation with-
out registering their activity, if they sell their goods or services
exclusively to state or cooperative (quasi-governmental)
159. Id The press has reported several recent examples of administrative sanctions
consisting of fines of 30 to 40 rubles or a month of corrective labor. See Iu. A. Ivanov,
Osnovanda i poriadok osvobozhdeniia of ugolovnoi otvelstvennosti s priviecheniem k
administrativnoi ovelstvennosti, KOMMENTARII SUDEBNOI PRAKTIKI ZA 1977 GOD, 166.
160. Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR § 10, May 3, 1976, SP SSSR 1976, No. 7,
st. 39.
161. Id at §4.
162. Id at § 1.
163. Id at § 4.
164. 1977 Biulleten' Normatiuykh Aktov § 12, No. 1, 10.
165. Id at § 10.
166. Id at § 5.
167. Id
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enterprises. 68
In recent years the government also has permitted open discus-
sion in the press of an idea that was once anathema in the Soviet
system, that is, retail sales of consumer goods by individuals who did
not manufacture the articles they sell. "Speculation," as Soviet
authorities refer to this activity, is defined as the purchase and resale
for profit of goods or other objects.' 69 During Stalin's rule, the gov-
ernment frequently inflicted the death penalty on speculators. 70
Since 1957, the RSFSR Criminal Code has distinguished between
speculators and "petty speculators," or, individuals who purchase
and resell consumer goods, agricultural produce, chits for purchas-
ing scarce goods, tickets to spectator events, and books. 171 Petty
speculators may be punished by three to fifteen days confinement, or
a fifty ruble fine. 172 In 1961, the government further mitigated the
punishment for petty speculation, by authorizing judges to transmit
first offenders to the custody of social organizations, such as trade
unions, for moral counseling and "application of measures of social
influence."' 73 Finally, in December 1974, the Soviet Union Supreme
Court issued instructions to trial judges. Although purporting to
"clarify" the law, the justices virtually eliminated the crime of petty
speculation, at least insofar as that crime might have applied to indi-
viduals undertaking occasional, nonsystematic resale activities. 74
The Court informed trial judges that individuals would be allowed
to sell goods that they had acquired by gift, barter, and inheritance,
or goods that they initially had purchased for personal use, without
committing the crime of speculation. 75 Thus, a prosecutor now
must prove not only that the individual bought an article which he
later resold, but also that the individual intended to resell the article
for profit at the time of his initial purchase. The Court's instructions
permit a judge to infer intent to resell for profit where an individual
168. Id
169. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR § 154.
170. See J. HOUGH & M. FAINSOD, supra note 49; MEDVEDEV AND MEDVEDEV, supra
note 6. The RSFSR Supreme Court warned trial judges in 1932 that they were "devoting
insufficient attention to cases of those who resell goods and to speculators....
[s]peculation in agricultural products and in the objects of mass consumption is obvi-
ously an especially socially harmful crime against inviolable and sacred social (socialist)
property." 1932 Sovetskaia Iustutsiia 27, 10.
171. Ukazaniia Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, Sept. 15, 1957, Vedomosti
Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 1957 No. 1, st. 5; UK RSFSR § 154, para. 3.
172. Id
173. Ukazaniia Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, Mar. 28, 1961, Vedomosti
Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 1961, No. 13, st. 229.
174. Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR, Dec. 14, 1974, No. 11; Biul-
leten' Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR 1975, No. 1.
175. Id at § 2.
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has sold numerous articles. 76
The market in second hand goods has flourished since the
Supreme Court issued these instructions, however, the ruble value of
this market is undeterminable.1 77 Moreover, the instructions appar-
ently have encouraged the practice of purchasing goods that are
plentiful in one section of the Soviet Union and reselling them in
another, where they are scarce. This was always a widespread
though illegal activity, 78 and it now has become even more com-
mon. The prosecutor's increased burden in proving a case of specu-
lation, the general scarcity of consumer products, and the
incremental legitimation of the profit motive have created a milieu
favorable to a bazaar type economy in the Soviet Union.
179
Flea markets are ubiquitous in the Soviet Union. 80 In every
population center of any size, one park, street comer, subway sta-
tion, or other area is known locally as a bazaar. In larger cities, mar-
kets for particular commodities are segregated. Pet markets are at
one subway station, stamp collectors' markets on another comer,
while clothing is sold at a third location. Proponents of legalizing
flea markets, for the sake of advocacy, term these bazaars "markets
for secondhand goods" or "markets for products of personal handi-
crafts." If bazaars were permitted, however, the difficulty of distin-
guishing articles produced or purchased for personal use by the
seller, from goods purchased by a merchant for the purpose of resale,
would allow "petty speculators" substantial latitude in practicing
their trade. One reader who advocated legalizing flea markets wrote
to the press that, "experience has shown that the negative phenom-
ena that restriction of market trade was supposed to combat-the
reselling of goods in short supply for example-are not disappearing.
Quite the contrary: It's becoming more difficult to bring these phe-
nomena to light and to put a stop to them."'' 81
176. Id
177. Soviet commentators do not attribute the growing market in second hand sales to
the Supreme Court's instructions; however, the Soviet press only has reported the wide-
spread existence of open air markets for second-hand goods in the past five years.
178. See E. H. Carr, 2 THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 335 (1952); H. SCHWARTZ, Rus-
SIA'S SOVIET ECONOMY 479 (1954).
179. A recent article in the Soviet press observed: "Flea markets are necessary-why
else would so many people flock to [them]. Despite all the measures taken to outlaw [the
flea market], it is very tenacious." Still, There's Growing Support For a Flea-Market Revi-
val, 34 CDSP 15, 16 (Aug. 4, 1982). Although purchasing goods for resale is a criminal
offense, and organized markets in secondhand goods are illegal under local ordinances,
the author "can't include the old women at these flea markets in the shady category of
speculators" because they "satisfy demand without requiring additional production facil-
ities or equipment." Id at 15.
180. This and following statements are based on anecdotal evidence obtained from
recent Western visitors to the Soviet Union.
181. Does Moscow Need Private Markets, 32 CDSP 15 (Nov. 19, 1980).
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Although the Soviet Union does not publish statistics on crimi-
nal activity, impressionistic sources, including newspaper reports,
indicate that investigations of speculation in consumer goods have
subsided significantly in recent years. For instance, these sources
indicate that city dwellers sometimes travel to villages, reside in a
local hotel for several months, buy large amounts of produce at col-
lective farm markets, then ship the goods to their homes for resale by
friends and relatives. 8 2 The deputy director of one collective farm
market wrote, "[w]e used to combat the speculators. . . . Several
years ago when regular 'salesmen' lived here for four or five months
at a stretch, the police. . . sent inquiries to their places of residence
and fined them. Now no notice is taken of such instances."' 8 3 The
employees of the department in charge of combating speculation, he
writes, are rarely at the market now. 84
As recently as 1977, the city of Moscow still maintained no
official flea market for the sale of pets. Nevertheless, one street cor-
ner was a notorious center for trading in animals. The press
reported that several hundred teenage boys were arrested at this
market during the course of one year: 85 "We patiently explained to
them why it is bad for them to get involved in peddling," a police
official explained, "but little comes of it. Just talking to them doesn't
have much effect."' 8 6 The following year the city legalized the pet
market. 87 On one weekend more than 4,500 merchants registered to
sell pets and pet supplies in the square. 88 The press account
acknowledged that many of the merchants had purchased the pets
elsewhere for resale. 89
The government has been increasingly tolerant of the actions of
private entrepreneurs who supply goods and services. In contrast to
the field of private agriculture, however, the government has not
offered incentives in the area of private manufacture. The ambiva-
lent attitude of political leaders concerning entrepreneurship is
demonstrated by the reduced number of forbidden professions, in
combination with the retention of the requirement that all
handicraftsmen register with local authorities. In addition, this atti-
182. See generally Are Out-of-Town Traders Taking Over 'Farm' MarketsZ 32 CDSP
12, 13 (Oct. 1, 1980).
183. Id at 12.
184. Id
185. -And Pet Market Turns Boys Into Peddlers, 29 CDSP 18 (May 25, 1977).
186. Id
187. From a reference to registration of merchants in a 1978 newspaper article, it can
be inferred that the city government began to permit private sales of pets during the
following year. Pet Vogue Breeds Brisk Private Trade, 30 CDSP 19 (Jan. 24, 1979).
188. Id
189. Id
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tude is reflected by the exercise of prosecutorial and police discretion
as an incentive to private market activity in contrast to the formal
prohibition of any resale of consumer goods for the purpose of
profit.
CONCLUSION
The Soviet Union has enacted major legislation, most impor-
tantly, Constitutional provisions, that enhance the right of individu-
als to use private property for profit. There are, however, significant
differences between the policy of the government toward private
farming, and its stance on handicrafts and private retail trade. The
central government actively is encouraging farming. It has author-
ized several forms of subsidies and assistance to peasants cultivating
small farm holdings because of the chronic food shortage. The suc-
cess of this policy depends in large part, however, on the willingness
of local officials and administrators to implement it.
On the other hand, Soviet leaders are not committed to private
manufacturing and retail trade. They are deeply suspicious of the
economic power that individuals may accumulate through trade. In
addition, the scarcity of household goods is not a serious political
problem for Soviet leaders. Whereas food shortages historically
have been a cause of profound popular unrest in Eastern Europe, a
shortage of household goods merely frustrates consumer desires, and
leaves unspent savings in the hands of the people. Legislation that
the Soviets have enacted now permits more handicraft activity than
did earlier legislation. The government, however, has not aban-
doned the principle of absolute state control over the means of pro-
duction. Consequently, the state has conceded no ground to private
manufacturing and trade that it could not withdraw.
In the areas of both agriculture and handicrafts, however, nulli-
fication of the law has had greater impact on individual ability to
exploit property freely. In the area of agriculture, nullification of the
law by local administrations, local soviets, and directors of collective
farms has prevented subsidies authorized by the central government
for private agriculture from reaching the peasantry. Soviet leaders
intend to make private agriculture a significant source of food for the
consumer. Thus, they have instructed Party, state, and social organi-
zations to assist peasants in the productive use of their small plots,
and to provide stock and fodder, light implements, sheds, and loans.
The central government also has instructed its agencies to explore
new methods for assisting peasants in the sale of private produce.
Bureaucratic inertia, shortages of manpower, ill will between pro-
gram participants, and disagreements with the objectives of the lead-
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ership have hindered the program of assistance. The government
apparently has not been able to change the behavior of its adminis-
trators merely by changing the law. Administrative disobedience of
the new agricultural laws has hindered the opportunity of individu-
als to use private property for gain.
In contrast, prosecutorial nullification of the prohibition on pri-
vate resale of goods for the purpose of profit, judicial leniency
towards individuals convicted of engaging in forbidden professions,
and the unwillingness of criminal investigators to pursue those who
engage in illegal market activity, appear to be major components of
the central government's policy on non-agricultural production and
trade. Soviet law enforcement officials simply are not pursuing vig-
orously violators of the laws relating to speculation, prohibited forms
of business, and registration of artisans. Nonenforcement of these
laws has been more significant than statutory liberalization in
increasing the freedom of individuals to use property.
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